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The impact of proportional profit taxes on input use is analyzed under conditions of
production uncertainty and risk aversion. Two kinds of profit taxes are considered:
proportional  profit taxes with perfect loss offset and revenue-neutral  profit taxes.
Their impact on optimal input use is examined  under various forms of production
uncertainty, such as the Just-Pope model and the cases of multiplicative and additive
uncertainty. It is shown that the structure of risk attitudes, the form of production
uncertainty,  the underlying (stochastic) technical interdependencies,  and the risk-
input relations are crucial features in determining the impact of proportional profit
taxes on optimal input use.
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Introduction
Levying proportional taxes on (pure economic) profit in the agricultural sector can serve
as a means for financinang agricultural development (e.g., irrigation projects), determining
sharecropping, and in allocating public mineral deposits or rangeland.  With a propor-
tional profit tax, the government becomes an effective partner in private development
projects by bearing a share of risk proportional to the tax rate (Mayshar). Consequently,
the number of investment plans undertaken  could be larger than would be the case
for  the same  rate  of interest,  particularly  when  returns  to farmers  are very  risky.
Furthermore, Quiggin suggests that, rather than selling water rights  t  t  an  r  at market prices,
the government could allocate them at low cost and impose a proportional profit tax to
overcome  allocational  inefficiencies  associated with natural  resource  use.  A similar
argument also could be made for publicly owned rangeland allocation.
Two forms of proportional profit taxes have been considered in the literature: profit
taxes  with  perfect  loss  offset  and  revenue-neutral  profit  taxes.  Perfect  loss  offset
presupposes that the firm (or its owners) has other income from which any loss can be
deducted.  In fact, tax laws in many countries provide for loss offset (Sandmo). On the
other hand, a revenue-neutral profit tax simultaneously adjusts the marginal rate and
the level of exemptions while keeping total tax receipts constant (Holloway).1 It has been
shown that proportional profit taxes have no impact on output level or on optimal input
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use under conditions of complete certainty (Penner; Sandmo). This necessarily restricts
the potential usefulness of proportional profit taxes to uncertain situations with risk-
averse producers.
Based on a review of the literature,  all previous  studies examining  the impact  of
proportional profit taxes on a firm's production decisions have dealt only with the case
of  price  uncertainty.  Their  main results  may  be  summarized  as  follows.  First,  a
proportional profit tax with perfect loss offset increases, leaves unchanged, or reduces
output produced by a competitive  firm according to whether relative risk aversion is
increasing, constant, or decreasing in profit (Penner; Sandmo).2 Second, a proportional
profit tax with perfect loss offset results in output expansion if partial risk aversion is
increasing in wealth (Katz; Briys and Eeckhoudt).3 Third, nondecreasing returns to scale
and decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) are sufficient  conditions for a positive
supply response to an increase in the rate of a proportional profit tax with perfect loss
offset (Quiggin).4 This result holds only in the case of increasing returns to scale since
constant returns is not compatible with long-run equilibrium in an industry with risk-
averse producers (Tressler and Menezes). Fourth, nonincreasing absolute risk aversion
is a sufficient condition for a competitive firm to expand production  s  a response to a
revenue-neutral  profit tax (Holloway).
The objective of this study is to analyze the impact of proportional profit taxes on a
firm's production decisions under conditions of production uncertainty. In particular,
their impact  on  optimal input  use is  examined  under various  forms  of production
uncertainty such as the Just-Pope model and the cases of multiplicative and additive
uncertainty.  It  is shown that the structure  of risk attitudes,  the form  of production
uncertainty, the underlying (stochastic) technical interdependencies, and the risk-input
relations are crucial features in determining the impact of proportional profit taxes on
optimal input use.5 The theoretical results derived in the next section are also compared
and contrasted to previous findings concerning the case of price uncertainty in order to
provide a more comprehensive  view of the impact of proportional  profit taxes on the
production decisions of a competitive and risk-averse firm. It is shown that different sets
of sufficient conditions are requited to determine the impact of proportional profit taxes
under price and production uncertainty.
Clearly, the implications of the theoretical results presented here are most important
for agriculture, where  production uncertainty  is the most  significant  source of risk.
Production  uncertainty  in agricultural  activities  is  mainly attributed  to exogenous
factors such as climate conditions (temperature, rainfall, drought, and freezes) and to
2 Robison and Barry, by using a mean-variance approximation to expected utility, found that the impact of a profit tax on
output is positive only in the limited case of constant absolute risk aversion.
3 Absolute,  relative, and partial risk aversion  may be defined as a function of profit or wealth. Following Katz, meas-
ures of risk aversion  are  properly defined based upon wealth  and not upon profit. Absolute  risk aversion is  defined  as
A(W)  = -uwW(W)/uw(W),  relative risk aversion as R(W)  = -uww(W)W/uw(W),  and partial relative risk aversion as  P(WO, 7c)
=  -uww(WO  +  s)i/uwy(WO), where  u(W) refers to the utility function, W =  WO +  Ts  to wealth,  WO to initial wealth, and sn  to profit.
A sufficient condition for partial risk aversion to be increasing in after-tax profit is that relative risk aversion is nondecreas-
ing and absolute risk aversion is nonincreasing, with at least one of them being nonconstant (Briys and Eeckhoudt).
4The same result holds for the rank dependent expected utility, but not for the more general model of smooth preferences
proposed by Machina.
'The  risk-input relations depend on whether an input is risk-reducing or risk-increasing. An input is said to be marginally
risk-reducing (risk-increasing) if, under risk aversion,  the  expected value  of its marginal  product is  less (greater) than
marginal factor cost (Pope and Kramer). Consequently, a risk-averse farmer uses less (more) of a marginally risk-increasing
(risk-reducing) input under production uncertainty than otherwise.
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risk-input relations of factors used. The existence of price support policies and of futures
and option markets, which attempt to reduce price risk, makes price uncertainty a less
significant source of farm income variability than otherwise.  Production uncertainty
remains, however, a significant source of risk even in the presence of crop insurance due
to adverse selection and moral hazard problems which do not allow for full coverage
against adverse events.
The remainder  of this article is organized  as follows.  The theoretical  results  are
derived in the next section, and they are compared and contrasted to previous findings
concerning the case of price uncertainty.  Their implications for resource management
and  policies  are  discussed in the following  section.  In the  final section,  concluding
remarks are presented.
Theoretical Results
Consider a risk-averse perfectly competitive firm facing production uncertainty. Suppose
that the firm makes its production decision before uncertainty is resolved, and that it
has no production flexibility to adjust its output ex post.6 Production uncertainty is
assumed to have the following form: y = F(x, e) = f(x) + h(x)e (Just and Pope), where y
is the planned output, F(x, e) is a quasi-concave production function, x is a vector of var-
iable inputs, and e is a rand  dom variable with E(e) =  and finite variance.7 In addition,
f5 > 0,  f.  < 0,  and  h5 >(<) 0 for every risk-increasing  (risk-reducing) input.8 If h(x) is
constant,  the  above  model  results  in the  case  of additive  production  uncertainty.
Alternatively, iff(x) = h(x), the case of multiplicative production uncertainty arises, i.e.,
y = f(x)(1 + e).
Additive  production uncertainty  corresponds  to cases  where  output variability is
independent of the level of planned output. This may be the case for uncertainty arising
from weather or other natural phenomena affecting agricultural production. In the case
of multiplicative production uncertainty, the variance of output is positively related to
the level of planned output. As an example, consider the case of pest disease where crop
losses depend on the level of planned output. Finally, the Just-Pope model allows the
simultaneous existence of both risk-increasing and risk-reducing inputs in order to take
into account differences in product variability caused by inputs like labor and fertilizer
versus capital, machinery, irrigation, and pesticides.
The  objective of the firm is to maximize the expected utility of initial wealth plus
after-tax profit for any predetermined level of a proportional profit tax with perfect loss
offset, T:
6 Even though production is uncertain, the cost of production is assumed to be known with certainty,  as it is measured in
terms of planned rather than actual output.
7 Loehman and Nelson developed a more general model of production uncertainty that could have been used. However, a
disadvantage  of using it in this particular case is that specific functional forms, such as exponential or power utility func-
tions, should be used to derive the relevant comparative static results. These functional forms assume constant absolute
and relative  risk aversion, respectively.  Such  restrictions  on risk attitude  compromise the  usefulness  of this model  in
analyzing  the  impact of profit taxes on  input  use,  which mainly  depends on  the  degree  of absolute  and relative  risk
aversion.
8 Hereinafter,  subscripts associated with functions denote partial derivatives, i.e.,  fX =  af/lx, f.  =  a
2 f/lax
2, etc.
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(1)  maxEu{W}  = Eu{Wo  + n(1-  -)
x
= Eu{Wo  + (1-  )[p(f(x)  + h(x)e)  - r'x],
where  u(W) is a von Neuman-Morgenstern  utility function with  uw > 0  and  uww < 0,
and p and r are the certain output price and the vector of certain input prices,  respec-
tively. The first-order conditions in the above  optimization problem for the two-input
case are:9
(2a)  Euw(W){p[f(x)  + h(x)e] - rl} = 0,
(2b)  Euw(W){p[f 2(x)  + h2(x)e] - r2} = 0.
The second-order conditions require the Hessian matrix D, with typical elements
D  E  = Euwp(fl  + hlle) +  EUWWT 2
D22  = Euw(f 22 + h 2e)  + Euw  r2,  and
D12  = D21  = Euwp(fl2 + hl2e)  +  EuWWC 1 rC2
to be negative semi-definite, where  Ti =  p(fi + hie) - wi  for i = 1, 2. The second-order con-
ditions  are satisfied  under risk aversion  (uww < 0)  and  a  quasi-concave  production
function.
To analyze the effect of an increase in profit tax rate on input use, differentiate  (2a)
and (2b) with respect to T and solve the resulting system of equations to obtain:
(3a)  T  =  x  1  [D22EUww(1 -~)n 1 -D1 2Euww( 1  - )2
(3b)  - =  [D 1
1Euww(1  - ) - D12Euww(1  - )  ]. aar  IDI
Given that  T2  = 671  = (h2/hl)il  (Pope and Kramer), substitution of the expressions for
D1,  D12, and D22 into (3a) and (3b) yields:
(4a) e(4a)  g  t  al  IDI  [Euww(1  - t) 1 7{p(EUwF22-  wF 12))]
(4b)  -T  - D- [EuWW(  - t) 2 {p(EuF 11 - 6)EuF)]
9 Even though the model can be extended to the n-input case,  algebraic manipulations  are increasingly  difficult as the
number of inputs increases. The results derived for the two-input case hold for the n-input case without any further ramifi-
cations.
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where Fi =  fij +  hie for all i, j  = 1, 2.10 The sign of ax i/19  depends on the sign ofthe brack-
eted term, as the sign of  |DI  is always positive in the two-input case from the second-
order conditions.
*  PROPOSITION  1. Under  stochastic  complementarity  and  similar  risk-input  relations,
a competitive firm decreases (increases)  the use of risk-reducing (risk-increasing)
inputs as a response to a marginal  increase in proportional  profit tax with perfect
loss offset as long as  partial  relative risk aversion is increasing  (IPRRA) in after-tax
profit. Under stochastic  substitutability,  different risk-input  relations, and  IPRRA,
a firm decreases the  use of risk-reducing inputs and increases the  use of risk-
increasing  inputs.
Proof.  Lemmas 1 and 2 in the appendix, along with the second-order conditions, are
sufficient to ensure that axi/a  <￿(>2)  0,  as hi (>)  0 and IPRRA.
An intuitive explanation of the above result is as follows. As the rate of profit tax
increases, farmers face less risk, without any change in their initial wealth. At the same
time, the variance of profit decreases along with expected profit. Under IPRRA, the risk
premium falls more than proportionally and farmers  are ready to assume more risk
(Briys and Eeckhoudt). 1Thus, they will shift toward the use of risk-increasing inputs.
The stronger fiscal pressure  on profit,  due to increased  tax rate, causes risk-averse
producers to increase the use of risk-increasing  inputs and to reduce the use of risk-
reducing inputs.  There is  empirical evidence  that farmers' risk attitudes  are  char-
acterized by IPRRA. For example, IPRRA has been found for Iowa corn producers (Love
and Buccola), Kansas wheat farmers (Saha, Shumway, and Talpaz), and Israeli farmers
(Bar-Shira, Just, and Zilberman), whereas the hypothesis of constant partial relative
risk aversion has been rejected for Idaho potato growers (Pope and Just).
From  Proposition  1, we  can  derive  an interesting  result  concerning  the  scale  of
production. A proportional profit tax with perfect loss offset may increase (decrease) the
scale of production under stochastic complementarity and IPRRA as long as all inputs
marginally reduce (increase) risk. In the case of stochastic substitutability, which seems
much more plausible, the impact of a proportional profit tax on output is ambiguous. It
depends  primarily on the  magnitude  of the elasticities  of substitution between the
marginally risk-reducing and risk-increasing inputs. It is more likely that the scale of
production will decrease in the presence of weak substitutability and factor normality.
*  COROLLARY  1. Under multiplicative production uncertainty, a competitive firm
increases  the use of all inputs as the rate  ofproportional  profit tax with perfect loss
offset increases,  if IPRRA and stochastic  factor  complementarity  prevail.
Proof.  Given that the form of multiplicative production uncertainty can only allow
for risk-increasing inputs, the proof follows immediately from Proposition 1.
10 In the Just-Pope model, Fu instead of fi is used to define complementarity  and substitutability. Specifically,  Fi >(<) 0
implies stochastic complementarity (substitutability) (Pope and Kramer).
11  IPRRA requires farmers to have a utility function in which marginal utility diminishes at a rapidly decreasing rate and
a proportional increase  in risk results in a more than proportional increase in aversion to risk. The first property implies
DARA, and the second implies increasing relative risk aversion.
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*  COROLLARY  2. A proportional  profit tax with perfect loss offset has no impact on
input use under additive production uncertainty.
Proof In the case of additive production uncertainty,  ni  =  0  for all i, and thus (4a)
and (4b) imply that axi/Ia  = 0 for all i.
The result for the case of multiplicative production uncertainty is similar to that for
the case of output price uncertainty, and thus all implications analyzed by Penner hold.
That is, a proportional profit tax with perfect loss offset can be shifted in the short run
by expanding output. On the other hand, a profit tax does not affect output if production
uncertainty has  an additive  form.  This result is similar to that for the case of risk-
neutral producers or the case of complete uncertainty.
In the case of a revenue-neutral taxation scheme, a proportional tax rate T  is accom-
panied by a portion of profit exempted from taxation, y, and the firm's objective function
is given as:
(5)  maxEu{W}  = Eu{Wo(1 - T)x  + yr}
= Eu{Wo  + (1  - r)[p(f(x) + h(x)e)  - r'x] + yT}.
The first- and the second-order conditions are similar to those in the case of proportional
profit tax with perfect loss offset, with the only difference being the arguments included
in the utility function.
To analyze the effect of an increase in profit tax rate on input use, differentiate the
first-order conditions with respect to  T; note that y changes according to  T in order to
keep tax revenue constant (dy/dt =  [E(7)  - y]/T); substitute the expressions for D,  D12 ,
and D22; and solve the resulting system of equations to obtain:
(6a)  ~  = i  2[hl )EuwwIhe{EuwF 22 - 6EuF 2 }],
-x_  h 2 Eu21hhle{EuwF22_u
(6b)  a2  _  1  ( P2h Eu)  w  2h2e{EuwF  ( 1/)EuwF 12
where
axi  axai  _  a  xi  ax  i  (
a;  aT  dEG=O  aT  y  a-C  dEG=O
is the Slutsky-type equation used by Holloway, and G refers to total tax payments to
the Treasury. The sign of  xci / a depends on the sign of the bracketed term, as the sign
of ID  is always positive from the second-order conditions.
*  PROPOSITION 2. Under  stochastic  complementarity and  similar  risk-input  relations,
a competitive firm decreases (increases)  the use of risk-reducing (risk-increasing)
inputs as a response to a revenue-neutral  tax as long as absolute risk aversion is
530  December 1999Proportional  Profit Taxes  531
nonincreasing.  Under  stochastic  substitutability,  different risk-input  relations,  and
nonincreasing absolute risk aversion, a firm decreases the  use of risk-reducing
inputs and increases the use of risk-increasing  inputs.
Proof By combining Lemma 2 in the appendix, Pope and Kramer's Lemma  3 (p.
493), and the second-order conditions,  dxi/8t <(2) 0, as hi (2 ) 0 and nonincreasing
absolute risk aversion.
For an intuitive explanation of this result, note that as the rate of profit tax increases,
risk faced by farmers  decreases since the variance  of profit decreases, but their initial
wealth  as  well  as  expected  profit  remain unchanged.  Given  that profit variability
decreases  more  than  proportionally  to  expected  profit,  which  actually  remains
unchanged, there is a tendency for farmers to undertake more risk. DARA sufficiently
ensures that the risk effect of the profit tax, which is associated with profit variability,
dominates the effect on expected profit. This results in expanded use of risk-increasing
inputs  and  contracted  use  of risk-reducing  inputs  up  to  the level  allowed  by  the
technical characteristics  of production and as long as expected profit is unchanged.  If
stochastic complementarity prevails and all inputs marginally increase risk, output is
expected to expand. Otherwise, the impact of a marginal tax rate increase on the scale
of production is ambiguous.
*  COROLLARY  3.  Under multiplicative production uncertainty, a competitive firm
increases  the use of all inputs as a response to a revenue-neutral  tax if absolute  risk
aversion is nonincreasing  in after-tax  profit and stochastic  factor  complementarity
prevails.
Proof.  It follows immediately from Proposition 2 by noting that only risk-increasing
inputs can be considered under multiplicative production uncertainty.
*  COROLLARY 4. Under  additive  production  uncertainty, a revenue-neutral  tax has no
impact on input use.
Proof In the case of additive production uncertainty,  ni =  0 for all i, and thus (6a)
and (6b) imply that  axi la  = 0 for all i.
The result for the case of multiplicative production uncertainty is similar to that for
the case of output price uncertainty  analyzed by Holloway,  where a revenue-neutral
increase in the marginal tax rate causes firms to expand output. On the other hand, a
revenue-neutral change in the marginal tax rate has no impact on a firm's output under
additive production uncertainty. This result is similar to that for the case of risk-neutral
producers or for the case of complete certainty.
Policy  Implications
The above  theoretical results  have  several useful policy implications  for agriculture
where  production uncertainty  is pervasive.  First consider  the case  of the  1986  Tax
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Reform Act, which may be viewed as a revenue-neutral tax policy.12 Under price uncer-
tainty, Holloway found that a reduction in the marginal tax rate induced by the Act
causes farmers  to contract output.  Under production  uncertainty,  the results of the
present study indicate that a reduction in the marginal tax rate is expected to cause
an increase in the use of risk-reducing inputs (e.g., pesticides, capital, irrigation) and
a decrease  in the use  of risk-increasing  inputs  (e.g.,  fertilizer,  hired  labor).  Output
contraction  is expected  only in the case of multiplicative  production uncertainty and
stochastic factor complementarity.
From a policy point of view,  proportional  profit taxes may be used as a means  for
implementing environmental policies and also as a way of improving the compatibility
of agricultural and resource policies. For example, by imposing a proportional profit tax
when  production  is  uncertain,  it is  expected  that farmers  will  increase  the  use of
fertilizer, which is usually considered to be a risk-increasing input, but they will reduce
the use of pesticides (fungicides, herbicides,  and insecticides),  which are often viewed
as risk-reducing inputs.1 3 These results may be used along with those of Leathers and
Quiggin and of Karagiannis,  which  concern  commodity and input price taxes under
production uncertainty,  to design and implement policies  in agriculture.  It  is worth
mentioning,  however,  that a proportional  profit tax (such as  taxes) cannot  provide
complete environmental  protection by itself, because while it promotes the contracted
use of some inputs which cause environmental  and health problems, it fails to bring
about the contracted use of other inputs.
With respect  to the  role  of proportional  profit taxes  on  the allocation  of natural
resources,  consider the cases  for groundwater  and public grazing.  Stochastic surface
water deliveries are the primary source of irrigation water in states such as California,
while groundwater serves  as a means  of buffering  farmers against drought. Private
property  rights  and  central  control  are  more  efficient  allocation  mechanisms  for
groundwater than common property arrangement. Instead of assigning exclusive and
tradable groundwater stock permits to individual farmers at a market price, as proposed
by Provencher and Burt, the government may allocate rights for pumping at a low cost
and impose a proportional profit tax to overcome inefficiencies.  According to the above
theoretical results, this will also ensure a contracted use of groundwater, given its risk-
reducing characteristic and the decreased variability of profit due to taxation. At the
same time, a more expanded use of surface water is expected.
Similarly,  a proportional  profit  tax may  overcome  conflicts  arising  between  the
common grazing fee established for federal land and the private grazing fees that vary
across  states.  As an alternative  to a permanent transfer of public grazing rights to
the private sector suggested by LaFrance and Watts, the U.S. Forest Service  and the
1 2 In fact, the revenue neutrality targeted by the 1986 Tax Reform Act was neutrality in the aggregate. This did not imply
that every individual taxpayer would pay the same (expected) tax as before the reform. I would like to thank an anonymous
reviewer for raising this point. Complete consistency between the revenue neutrality assumed in the theoretical model and
revenue neutrality in the aggregate is ensured only in the presence of a representative producer.
13Leathers and Quiggin considered pesticides as risk-reducing inputs, while Pannell, and Horowitz and Lichtenberg raised
some concerns about its risk-input relation. Recent empirical evidence shows that  fungicides behave as risk-increasing inputs
in Swiss wheat production (Gotsch and Regev; Regev, Gotsch, and Rieder). Empirical evidence with respect to the risk-input
relation of fertilizers is also mixed. Nelson and Preckel; Love and Buccola; and Regev, Gotsch, and Rieder found nitrogen to
be risk-increasing, while Lambert found it to be risk-reducing. Potassium has been found to be risk-increasing (Nelson and
Preckel; Love and Buccola).  Nelson and Preckel  found phosphorous to be risk-increasing, while Love and Buccola found it
to be risk-reducing.
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Bureau of Land Management could implement a uniformly low public grazing fee, as
they did prior to Rangeland Reform '94. Then, they may use a proportional profit tax to
redistribute benefits across grazers more evenly. Profit differentials reflect differences
in the nutritive content of forage and its availability, the availability and proximity of
water for forage sources, and the local market prices for livestock and substitute feed. 1 4
By taking this into account, a proportional  profit tax may resolve some of the ineffi-
ciencies  associated  with  a nationwide  uniform public  grazing fee.  In  addition,  the
proposed policy would not affect either agency's coffers or administration cost. Moreover,
it would not result in a more intensive use of the grazing resources in the short run as
long as forage is considered to be a risk-reducing input in cattle production.
On the other hand, proportional  profit  subsidies may be  employed  as a means  of
enhancing agricultural mechanization, in addition to other uses (Binswanger). As long
as machinery  is  considered  to  be  a risk-reducing  input,  such  a  policy provides  an
incentive for farmers to invest in more advanced  mechanical technology. 15 A propor-
tional profit subsidy may also induce adoption  of modern irrigation technologies.  It
may be used as an alternative to water taxes, proposed by Caswell and Zilberman, to
promote the use of sprinkler, center pivot, and drip technologies. Irrigation is considered
to be a risk-reducing input as it  increases (or keeps constant) yield when a drought
occurs during the crop session, but it does not affect yield when rainfall is adequate and
timely. Given that sprinkler and drip irrigation are water-saving technologies compared
to surface irrigation, a reduction in water use can be indirectly achieved.
Concluding Remarks
It has been shown that proportional profit taxes have similar effects on input use under
output price and production uncertainty as long as in the latter case the distribution of
profit is independent of input quantities, i.e., multiplicative production uncertainty. If,
however, the distribution of profit depends on the level of inputs used, the impact of a
profit tax on input use depends on the degree of risk aversion and risk-input relations.
In this case, different effects arise for risk-reducing and risk-increasing inputs.
The impact of proportional  profit  taxes  on output  also  depends  on  the  source  of
uncertainty. Given IPRRA, a profit tax with perfect loss offset has an output-expanding
effect under output price uncertainty, but this is not necessarily true under production
uncertainty-except  for the case of multiplicative  production  uncertainty and factor
complementarity. A similar argument holds for the case of a revenue-neutral tax and
DARA. Thus, the source of uncertainty is important in determining the impact of pro-
portional profit taxes on the scale of production.
The results concerning revenue-neutral profit taxes are applicable to a large number
of farmers, as nonincreasing absolute risk aversion is only a counterpart of the sufficient
conditions for IPRRA. Furthermore, a revenue-neutral  profit tax seems to be a much
more easily accepted policy,  as it does not affect expected  profit. In fact, the results
14According to LaFrance and Watts, these factors along with landlord services (i.e., fencing, water access, periodic moving,
checking, supplemental feeding) determine the differences in private grazing fees across states.
16 Some doubts may be raised as to whether all machinery/equipment marginally reduces risk.  Actually, this is an empirical
question and further research is needed in this direction.
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associated with a revenue-neutral  profit tax are  more likely to hold for all farmers,
as nonincreasing absolute risk aversion is a widely accepted form of risk attitude. This
does not mean, however, that the results concerning profit taxes with perfect loss offset
have only academic interest.  In contrast, recent empirical  evidence reported by Love
and Buccola; Saha, Shumway, and Talpaz; and Bar-Shira, Just, and Zilberman provides
support for Arrow's thesis about IPRRA.
Evaluating the potential impact of proportional profit taxes is a difficult task due to
the  limited  number of empirical  studies  providing  information  about farmers'  risk
attitudes and risk-input relations.  Given that uncertainty gives rise to real economic
problems  only  in the  presence  of risk  (aversion),  these  pieces  of information  are
interrelated  and  can be valuable  only if  they are obtained simultaneously.  Further
empirical research is required in this area since production uncertainty is pervasive in
agriculture,  and thus it should be considered seriously in designing and implementing
policies.
[Received August 1998;final revision received May 1999.]
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Appendix
*  LEMMA  1.  Euw(Wo, 7(1 - T))7x  2(S)  0, as hx <(>)  0 V.
Proof Let  e* be that value  of e  such that nX  = 0, and the  corresponding  partial relative  risk-
aversion coefficient  is P(Wo,  t (1 - T))  = 0.  IPRRA implies that
P(W o , 7l(1 - T))  = -UWW(WO,  -(1  - )/))U((W 0, T1  - (1  - ))  ()P(Wo,  (1 - 1)),
as  e >(￿)  e* (Briys and Eeckhoudt). Multiplying both sides by x, and noting that  Tx is positive
(negative), as hx ￿(>)  0 (Pope and Kramer), the above expression yields:
-uW(Wo,  71(1  - T))7T(1 - T)7 X <(>)P(Wo, it(l - T))uw(Wo,  70(1 - T))x,
as hx ￿(>)  0 V  e. Taking expectations of both sides and using the first-order conditions results in
Euw  (Wo, 7(1 - T))7(1  - T)x  >(-<) 0,  as hx g(>) 0.  Q.E.D.
*  LEMMA  2.  EuW(Wo, 7(1 - t))F 22 - (h2/h1)Euw(Wo, 7(1 - ))F 12 < 0  if: (i) inputs  have the same risk
characteristics  and  they are stochastic  complements to each other, or (ii)  inputs  have different risk
characteristics  and they are  stochastic substitutes.
Proof The quasi-concavity  of y =  f(x) +  h(x)e implies that Euw(Wo,  7i(1  - O))F 22 < 0.  Euw(Wo,
7r(1 - T))F 1 2 <(>) 0 under stochastic substitutability (complementarity). In addition, -(h2/h1) <(>)  0
if both inputs  are risk-reducing or risk-increasing  (one is risk-reducing and the other is risk-
increasing).  Q.E.D.
Karagiannis